Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability by Rabin, Robert L.




Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability 
Robert L. Rabin 
Stanford Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, State and Local 
Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 197 
(1997). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol30/iss2/2 
 
This Symposium Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RESTATING THE LAW: THE DILEMMAS
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Robert L. Rabin*
Tracing products liability law from its origins to present day
developments, Professor Rabin discusses the long-standing presence
of interwoven strands of contract and tort ideology, as well as the
perennial tensions between strict liability and negligence. These
themes are evident both in the distinctly influential California case
law and in the two Restatement efforts to systematize the doctrine
that has emerged nationally. Rabin identifies the manner in which
foundational ideological precepts of consumer expectations and
enterprise liability have contributed to a continuously dynamic, if
often unsettled, debate over the appropriate regime for resolving
product injury claims.
The pathway to the current effort to establish a set of foun-
dational principles for cases involving product-related inju-
ries-the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability'-is
long and tortuous, with many diversionary forks along the way.
Where to begin-Winterbottom v. Wright?2 MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.?' Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.?4 Traces of each
of these landmark decisions can be found in the Restatement
(Third), as they could be in its ground-breaking forerunner,
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' My inten-
tion in this introduction is to provide some context to the
current debate about the Restatement (Third) by offering an
overview of the products liability law landscape, with particu-
lar attention to the key features that have regularly troubled
courts and commentators: the mixed contract-tort heritage of
products liability law and the troubled relationship between
strict liability and negligence approaches.6
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. A.B. 1960, North-
western University; J.D. 1963, Northwestern University Law School; Ph.D. 1967,
Northwestern University.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Final Draft,
Preliminary Version, 1996) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft].
2. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
4. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
6. To keep the inquiry manageable, I will largely restrict my vantage point to
a particular setting which has been especially influential: the evolution of products
liability law in California against the backdrop of the Restatement efforts.
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I. IN THE BEGINNING
The conventional starting point in relating the evolution of
products liability law is the mid-nineteenth century case of
Winterbottom v. Wright,7 in which a passenger brought suit for
personal injuries against the supplier of a mail coach that
broke down. Lord Abinger's famous opinion articulated a
privity limitation that protected remote suppliers and manu-
facturers from liability to injured consumers and users of
products.' In doing so, Lord Abinger was in harmony with
much of mid-nineteenth century accident law, which relegated
tort principles-in particular: the fledgling negligence princi-
ple-to second-class status. Consider, in this regard, the
exalted contemporaneous reliance on the contract paradigm in
workplace injury cases and the property paradigm in land
occupier cases.9 Moreover, there was a natural feel to a con-
tract perspective in product injury cases, most of which (al-
though, ironically, not Winterbottom) originated in a sale of
goods-a commercial, relational transaction in distinct contrast
to the highway injuries involving strangers that served as the
raw material for the emerging doctrinal principles of negligence
in tort law.'"
A half century (and many exceptions) later, Judge Cardozo
finally put the Winterbottom limitation to rest in the most
widely influential early twentieth century tort case, Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co." Cardozo's MacPherson opinion is,
in some ways, quite opaque. For the most part he busies
himself (in good common law fashion) with rationalization of
earlier precedents. The tip-off that something more is happen-
ing comes midway through the opinion, however, when he
remarks almost in passing:
7. 152 Eng. Rep. at 402.
8. See id. at 405 (holding that without privity of contract only a public duty or
public nuisance could give rise to a cause of action for tort).
9. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Princi-
ple: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925, 933-48 (1981) (describing the influence
of contract and property principles on the development of tort law).
10. See id. at 947-48 (noting the importance of the fault principle to cases involv-
ing strangers).
11. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard
life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be
foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have
put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We
have put its source in the law. 2
"The law," in this context, could only be read one way-tort
law, with its concomitant general duty of due care. This
perspective would be the new prism through which to view
product-related injuries henceforth.
These two early landmarks set up a polar tension in products
liability thinking that has never been fully resolved: the
contrasting paradigms of contract and tort characterization of
product injuries. The law of products liability remained ground-
ed in the tort law concept of liability for negligent conduct for
the next half century, but beneath an apparently calm surface,
new dynamic forces were stirring. To begin with, in a number
of cases involving injuries from food products, the contractual
heritage of products liability had re-emerged, in the form of
reliance on warranty theory."3 In sharp contrast to Winter-
bottom, however, contract notions now appeared as a sword
rather than a shield from liability: courts extended sales-
related warranties beyond the immediate contracting parties
to create strict liability against the maker of harm-producing
foodstuffs.
At least one soon-to-be-prominent jurist, however, Justice
Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, had a still-
broader vision. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 4 a case
involving injury to a waitress from a shattering soda bottle,
Justice Traynor suggested in his much-celebrated concurring
opinion that tort law, itself, might reach beyond a MacPherson-
based duty of reasonable care and extend general protection
to injured parties on strict liability grounds. 5 Traynor
anchored his position not in the consumer expectations per-
spective rooted in the warranty law of contractual relations,
12. Id. at 1053.
13. See, e.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 175 N.E. 105, 107 (1931)
(finding a grocer liable under an implied warranty of merchantability for selling a loaf
of bread with a pin in it). See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104 (1960) (acknowledg-
ing begrudgingly that "the assault" had proceeded, at the time, under warranty
theory, and proposing tort as the more appropriate legal regime).
14. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
15. See id. at 440-44.
200 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:2&3
but in the ideology of enterprise liability, which had served as
one of the foundational principles for the workers' compensa-
tion movement.16 As Justice Traynor saw it:
Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre-
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and
the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfor-
tune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distribut-
ed among the public as a cost of doing business."7
Thus, in succinct terms Traynor described the twin engines
of enterprise liability theory that would serve as the generative
force for doctrinal developments occurring two decades later:
products liability law as a medium for creating incentives to
safety and as a vehicle for broad risk-spreading. In 1944,
however, and for another two decades, his manifesto was
ignored. Products liability law-indeed, tort law generally
-remained a rather sleepy backwater in the civil justice
system.
II. PATIENCE REWARDED
Eventually, Justice Traynor was vindicated. In Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' 8 which involved an injury to the
user of a power tool, he wrote for a unanimous California
Supreme Court, ruling that the courts of that state henceforth
would decide product defect injuries under a regime of strict
16. See generally VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYpassim (1995)
(arguing that the theory of enterprise liability emerged from the legal and political
fervor that produced workers' compensation legislation).
17. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
18. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
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liability in tort. 9 The case served as the foundation not only
for a series of landmark California opinions establishing the
contours of the newly articulated strict liability principle, but
also as the buttress for section 402A,2 ° which the American
Law Institute (ALI) formally adopted one year later."'
Although these developments might have seemed to herald
both the conquest of tort over contract as the favored legal
regime for products cases and the triumph of strict liability
over negligence as the reigning liability principle, in fact
neither victory was complete. Just three years before
Greenman, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,22 had opted for the warranty route
taken in the earlier food cases in extending strict liability to
product injuries generally. 2 Greenman eclipsed Henningsen in
short order, as most states adopted a tort regime, but the
Restatement showed the unmistakable mark of the con-
tract/warranty thinking of Henningsen even as it articulated
a theory of strict liability in tort.
Under the Restatement approach, liability turned on the sale
of "any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer."24 Critically, however, the Re-
statement defined the concept of defect as "a condition not
19. See id. at 900-01.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
21. On the evolution of section 402A and the influence of Greenman, see Herbert
W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 720 (1970). Although it was formally adopted by the ALI
in 1964, a narrower draft version-limited to sales of food-had been introduced as
early as 1961.
22. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
23. See id. at 76-77.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). Section 402A reads, in
its entirety:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. § 402A.
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contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unrea-
sonably dangerous to him."25 And, in spelling out the latter
notion of "unreasonably dangerous," the commentary provides
that the product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it." 26 This reference point of consumer expectations,
with its heritage in warranty/contract, has proven to be a con-
tinuing point of contention to this very day.
7
If the ambiguity regarding tort and contract justifications for
liability has proven hard to eliminate, so too has the relation-
ship between strict liability and negligence been remarkably
resistant to easy resolution. Contrast Traynor's confident
assertion in Greenman that a strict tort liability regime should
govern product defect cases 28 with section 402A-in particular,
with the qualifying language that a seller would be liable for
injury from a product sold in a defective condition that is
"unreasonably dangerous." 29 Does this language indicate that
negligence considerations had crept back into supposedly strict
liability? This question, along with the continuing debate
generated by the mixed contract/tort heritage of the Restate-
ment, has contributed to protracted disagreement over the
strictness of strict liability in products liability law. Indeed, it
was not long before these lines of cleavage became apparent
in the case law.
III. EXUBERANCE REINED IN
Initially, the courts strongly endorsed the expansive defect
concept enunciated in Greenman. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp. ,30 involving a bakery truck driver injured by inadequately
secured trays when his vehicle ran off the road, the California
Supreme Court stood its ground against the invasive menace
of negligence. Specifically, the court resisted the section 402A
25. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
26. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
27. See infra Part IVA.
28. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) ("A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being.").
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(1) (1965).
30. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
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requirement that a defect be" 'unreasonably dangerous' [which
had] crept into our jurisprudence without fanfare,"'" and which
threatened to undermine the newly articulated regime of strict
liability in tort. The Cronin court saw "no difficulty in applying
the Greenman [strict liability] formulation to the full range of
products liability situations."32 Harkening back to Escola,33 and
reaffirming the authority of Greenman,34 the court asserted
that manufacturers were to bear the costs of injuries from
defective products..5 In short, strict liability meant strict
liability.
This position of certitude would not last the decade-nor
could it, to my mind. The early landmark California cases had
failed to acknowledge that products cases come in different
packages: some involve manufacturing defects (the flawed unit
that differs from standard units of the product), some involve
design defects (the risk that is intrinsic to the entire product
line), and some involve deficient warnings. Indeed, in both
Greenman and Cronin one cannot be sure whether the claimed
defect was an aberration or intrinsic to the product line. The
court simply was not thinking in those terms. Moreover, none
of these early cases came to grips with the appropriate stan-
dard in an adequacy of warning claim.
As soon as these distinctions became evident, the shortcom-
ings of the Greenman/Cronin approach were apparent. Strict
liability operated in a conceptually satisfying fashion as long
as manufacturing defects were involved. A flawed unit of a
standardized product which caused injury could be considered
a sufficient basis for recovery without further inquiry into the
efforts to minimize risks prior to marketing.
Strict liability did not function as smoothly, however, in the
other types of products cases. How were courts to administer
strict liability in warning cases? Was every warning inadequate,
no matter how comprehensive and prominent, whenever the
product caused an injury that heeding the proposed warning
would have avoided? Both fairness and efficiency considerations
underlying tort liability seemed to argue otherwise.36 And what
31. Id. at 1159.
32. Id. at 1162.
33. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
34. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
35. See Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1162-63.
36. Indeed, so did a consumer expectations standard under a reasonable interpre-
tation of the concept. After all, it has to be possible, at some point, to have satisfied
the dictates of informed choice.
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of cases involving a design defect claim, as distinguished from
a manufacturing defect? Was an automobile that failed to
prevent injury to its driver when struck by another travelling
ninety miles per hour defective per se, because it failed to have
"secondary collision" features that made it accident-proof-no
matter how many safety features had been designed into the
product? Neither tort nor warranty goals could be squared with
unconditional strict liability based on a contentless standard
of "defect."
These fundamental considerations illuminate the predica-
ment of section 402A only a few years after its passage. Lack-
ing the dynamic character of common law-a dynamism that,
as we will see, allowed California to move beyond Cronin six
years later in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 3 -section 402A
soon stood for whatever courts decided to engraft upon it. An
anomaly to begin with-a "restatement" before there was any
law to restate-it soon took on a somewhat Delphic character.
The illustrations are numerous. Like Greenman and its early
progeny, section 402A does not recognize explicitly the categori-
cal variety of products cases. 38 Adopted prior to the assimila-
tion of comparative negligence into tort law-and in advance
of any judicial attention to defensive claims of consumer
misconduct in strict liability product injury cases-section
402A adopts by reference an all-or-nothing approach to contrib-
utory fault derived from defenses to traditional strict liability.
39
Antedating the major pharmaceutical litigation of the succeed-
ing decades, section 402A offers an arguably superfluous
comment on "unavoidably unsafe products" that has been the
37. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
39. See id. § 402A cmt. n. Comment n reads:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence
of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see
§ 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form
of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name
of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict
liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
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source of great confusion.4 ° The section also fails to address
product injuries that cause only economic loss as distinguished
from personal injury or property damage,4 and it takes no
position on whether liability under its provisions extends to
bystanders.42 In sum, while the lofty impulse to state a new
charter for products liability was understandable, its execution
-at least as a "restatement"-was premature.
Twenty-five years after its adoption, two courses were
possible: section 402A could continue its fall into desuetude,
or the ALI could start from scratch-taking a fresh look at the
state of products liability law in the 1990s. In choosing the
latter course, it soon became apparent that the ALI operated
in a milieu in which old tensions between tort and contract
perspectives and between strict liability and negligence stan-
dards remained unresolved.
IV. CENTRAL TENSIONS REVISITED
The California chronology is again illustrative, if not neces-
sarily representative. Six years after the California Supreme
Court's bold effort to stay the course in Cronin, by insisting
that Greenman could be applied without qualification to all
variety of products cases, the court in Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering Co.43 confronted the inadequacy of a blanket rule in all
40. Id. § 402A cmt. k. The comment appears to be aimed at ensuring that strict
liability will not discourage manufacturers from marketing products with great social
benefits, like prescription drugs. To this end, comment k provides: "Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id. The scope of the intended exemption
has never been clear. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and For Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 864-72 (1983)
(recounting the genesis of comment k to explain its ongoing ambiguity).
41. The California Supreme Court had an early occasion to consider whether its
new strict liability principle applied to pure economic loss cases in Seely v. White
Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). Seely involved a defective truck that caused its
owner considerable lost profits but no personal injury or property damage. Writing
for the court, Justice Traynor held that product defect cases involving exclusively
economic loss should be governed by contract and warranty law, rather than strict
liability in tort. See id. at 149-51. The U.S. Supreme Court later adopted the Seely
approach in an admiralty case. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.,
476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
42. In a caveat following the black letter text, section 402A provides that no
position is taken on whether the section applies "to harm to persons other than users
or consumers." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A caveat (1).
43. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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products cases. Barker involved a claim of injury by the opera-
tor of a high-lift loader which capsized while being driven on
a hill. A contentless "defect" standard provided no basis for
distinguishing between liability for the loader's overturning
while being operated on a level surface as opposed to while
being driven up a steep mountainside. Forced to confront the
inadequacy of its prior jurisprudence, the court responded by
formulating a two-prong test: A design was defective either if
it failed to satisfy consumer expectations, or if through hind-
sight the product's design posed "excessive preventable dan-
ger."
44
For present purposes, the salient aspect of Barker is that by
adopting this hybrid test it clearly reveals the continuing,
deep-seated ambivalence about the underlying foundation of
liability for product injuries-an ambivalence that, even today,
remains at the core of products liability law in California, and
that has, more generally, generated continuing controversy
over the new Restatement effort.
A. Mixed Heritage Revisited
On the mixed tort/contract heritage axis, Barker steers an
ecumenical course by incorporating both a contract-warranty-
grounded consumer expectations test and a tort-enterprise
liability-based excessive preventable dangers test. The latter
constitutes California's contribution to a seemingly endless
series of efforts by courts and commentators to spell out a risk-
utility standard for defining defect.45
44. Id. at 454. In the same passage, the court treats excessive preventable danger
as synonymous with risk-benefit analysis. See id.
45. See id. at 455. The Barker test provides that
a jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of the danger
posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the
mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an
improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the con-
sumer that would result from an alternative design.
Id.
Compare the widely noted seven-factor test proposed in John W. Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 (1973):
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
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The new Restatement, on the other hand, comes down on the
side of those courts and commentators who would cut ties with
consumer expectations as a distinct standard of liability, opting
instead for a risk-utility approach to defining design defects.46
In doing so, the Reporters implicitly relegate any residual
allegiance to contract law notions of consumer expectations
-- apart from its applicability as one factor among many in
measuring risk in design cases-to manufacturing defect cases,
where they recognize deviance from the product norm as a
sufficient basis for grounding liability.47
There are substantial reasons that can be put forward for
making risk-utility considerations the central focus in design
defect cases. To begin with, consumer expectations arguably
are nonexistent in many situations, particularly those involving
technical product designs.48 The California court's response to
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive
to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge
of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 837-38.
46. Specifically, section 2(b) provides that a product is defective in design "when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe." Proposed Final Draft,
supra note 1, § 2(b). The reasonable alternative design (RAD) concept is central to the
Restatement's approach. See id. § 2 cmt. e (discussing relevant factors to consider in
applying section 2(b)'s RAD test).
Comment d does recognize an exception, however, for "products that are so
manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of
danger, [such] that liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alterna-
tive design." For criticism of this exception, see Michael J. Take, Note, Categorical
Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment d Caveat Should Be
Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1181, 1201-08 (1996).
47. The Restatement also recognizes a special exception for food products, such
as an unexpected bone in a commercial food preparation, where consumer expectations
are recognized as an appropriate standard. See id. § 2 cmt. g.
48. Another important situation in which the role of consumer expectations is
dubious to say the least is injuries to bystanders. Strict liability to bystanders for
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this particular objection has been to sharpen its Barker test by
making explicit the inapplicability of the consumer expecta-
tions prong in complex design cases.49
From another perspective, consumer expectations can be
viewed as a two-edged sword that can be used readily to
undermine the enterprise responsibility objectives of products
liability-at least as far as risk-spreading is concerned. More
specifically, in cases where the risk of injury posed by the
product is fairly apparent (for example, a motorcycle without
leg guards), a consumer expectations test, interpreted literally,
could be taken to preclude liability in any case of an "open and
obvious" risk.5 ° Once again, the test can be read charitably to
product users to avoid this result. It can be argued, however,
that the better course is to focus exclusively on balancing risks
and utility in assessing the adequacy of a design, and to treat
the patent character of the risk as simply a negative factor in
assessing overall product risk.
B. Strict Liability and Negligence Revisited
While Barker most obviously reflected a continuing ambiv-
alence regarding the proper justification for liability (consumer
expectations or risk-utility), the decision also had important
implications for the appropriate liability standard in products
cases, strict liability or negligence. On first impression, the
second prong of Barker seems to reject Cronin outright.
Excessive preventable danger, as spelled out in the court's
product injuries was recognized early in the Greenman line of cases. See Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969). In these cases, a consumer
expectations test seems entirely misplaced.
49. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994) (stating that
while the consumer expectations test is still valid, it is inappropriate where the
plaintiffs theory is based upon a highly technical design defect). A subsequent
intermediate appellate court case holds that it is plaintiff s choice whether to proceed
on a consumer expectations or risk-utility theory when both are available. See
Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 446, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
50. See, e.g., Kutzler v. AMF Harley-Davidson, 550 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (citing the open and obvious nature of the alleged design defect as a
determinative factor in favor of finding the defendant not liable for plaintiff's injuries).
For an illustrative case discussing this possibility, and rejecting consumer expecta-
tions in favor of risk-utility, see Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1245
(Colo. 1987).
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opinion, 1 may not be the precise counterpart of the Re-
statement's "unreasonably dangerous" modification of the
defect definition that the Cronin court was so anxious to
disavow. Stripped to their essentials, however, both tests
-sound suspiciously like the Carroll Towing negligence formu-
lation.52
Inadvertently or not, however, the Barker court gave the
strict liability legacy of Justice Traynor its due by slipping into
its excessive preventable danger test a single phrase-"if
through hindsight" 53-that had no bearing on the immediate
case, but proved a harbinger of things to come. Taken literally,
that phrase directed that the risks of a particular product were
to be measured ex post (at the time of trial) rather than ex
ante (at the time of distribution). An ex ante test is the logical
counterpart of a negligence approach (raising questions about
what the defendant knew or should have known when the
product was marketed), and an ex post test follows naturally
from a strict liability standard (focusing on the product's
intrinsic risks rather than the manufacturer's conduct). The
distinction becomes especially critical in pharmaceutical and
toxics cases where new risks associated with a product often
become apparent only after the product has been on the
market. In practice, the issue most frequently arises in duty-to-
warn situations: the injured party claims that from a strict
liability perspective a warning is deficient if it fails to warn of
all risks, discoverable or not at the time the product was
marketed.
Once again, the tension has not been put to rest. In Brown
v. Superior Court,54 the California Supreme Court's effort to
bring a semblance of order to the DES cases, 55 the court
51. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454-55 (Cal. 1978).
52. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), in
which Judge Learned Hand spelled out his famous formulation of the negligence
calculus, stating that a breach of duty occurs where the burden of adequate protec-
'tion is less than the probability of injury multiplied by the gravity of the injury if it
should occur. The test generally has been taken to articulate a cost-benefit standard
of liability for negligent acts. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
53. Barker, 573 P.2d at 454. The court also shifted the burden of proof on exces-
sive preventable danger to the defendant. See id. at 455.
54. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
55. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), a claim based on
DES exposure, the court announced its much-noted market share theory of liability
in cases where identification of a single responsible manufacturer in an industry
making a fungible product was impossible. See id. at 936-38. The court left open a
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seemed to weigh in on the side of those jurisdictions which had
embraced the special treatment that comment k to section
402A afforded to prescription drugs. The court essentially
applied a negligence standard of liability: "[W]e hold that a
manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a
prescription drug so long as the drug was properly prepared
and accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities
that were either known or reasonably scientifically knowable
at the time of distribution."56
Only three years later, however, a dissonant note crept in.
In Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,57 the court
faced the parallel question of whether to hold asbestos manu-
facturers responsible for failure to warn irrespective of whether
they reasonably might have known of the product risks at the
time of distribution. In what might have been taken as a quick
retreat from Brown-except for the sui generis status of
asbestos cases-the court in Anderson asserted that strict
liability dictated a more stringent standard than negligence.
The court took pains to explain just what this distinction
entailed:
[A] reasonably prudent manufacturer might reasonably
decide that the risk of harm was such as not to require a
warning as, for example, if the manufacturer's own testing
showed a result contrary to that of others in the scientific
community. Such a manufacturer might escape liability
under negligence principles. In contrast, under strict
liability principles the manufacturer has no such leeway;
the manufacturer is liable if it failed to give warning of
dangers that were known to the scientific community at the
time it manufactured or distributed the product.5"
One well might question, whether, in reality, a manufacturer
would escape liability under negligence by claiming its good
faith belief in its own tests, despite results to the contrary in
the outside scientific community. As long as this somewhat
mystifying distinction was limited to asbestos cases, however,
variety of issues about how to define the market and how to allocate liability among
defendants-issues which Brown addressed-along with the question of the proper
standard of liability for drug manufacturers that is my present concern.
56. Brown, 751 P.2d at 482-83 (footnote omitted).
57. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
58. Id. at 559.
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it could be taken as an exception for a particularly disfavored
industry, rather than as a wholesale retreat from Brown.
This distinction soon proved illusory, however-demonstrat-
ing the tenacious grip of strict liability thinking, even in
adequacy-of-warning cases. The court's effort at a grand
synthesis comes in Carlin v. Superior Court,9 a claim by a
plaintiff alleging failure to warn of the risks of the prescription
drug Halcion. The court, reaffirming Anderson, claims consis-
tency with Brown, as well. Admittedly, Brown had held that
the adequacy of prescription drugs was to be measured by ex
ante knowledge of the manufacturer, or, to put it another way,
that there would be no liability for risks unknowable at the
time of distribution. But, according to the Carlin court, that
test did not mean a retreat to a negligence standard-as
Anderson explained. Rather, Anderson created-for all products
-a "hybrid" standard: Product manufacturers would be liable
only for ex ante risks, but they would be held to a standard
approximating perfect knowledge, rather than reasonable
knowledge, about known or knowable risks.6 ° The byword
seems to be omniscience regarding known or knowable risks
at the time of distribution.6 '
"True" strict liability would, of course, demand still more.
When the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down its widely
noted opinion in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. ,62
59. 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996).
60. Id. at 1348-51. Is it possible to think of an example where this distinction
would have real meaning? Consider the possibility of a small company in Finland
discovering a risk that was unknown to defendant, the maker of a similar product.
Further, the Finnish company has already begun marketing its "competing" product,
which avoids the risk that causes injury to plaintiff. This seems to be the type of
situation where the court thinks defendant's liability turns on its being strict. But
in this era of global communication and heightened expectations of corporate research
and development responsibilities, would defendant escape liability under a risk-utility
test even in this situation, if plaintiff argued constructive knowledge?
61. Cf Hoven v, Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 392-93 (Wis. 1977) (rejecting plaintiffs
claim that doctors should be held to a strict liability standard in medical malpractice
cases). The plaintiffs difficulty in articulating a theory arose out of the fact that any
such liability standard exceeding responsibility for unreasonable conduct has to take
account of the reality that patients frequently are not "cured" in some magical, pain-
free sense even after successful treatment. The court articulated the plaintiffs
argument as follows (although ultimately rejecting strict liability): "[If a plaintiff
could show that a hypothetical virtually perfectly informed doctor, working in a
perfectly equipped hospital, could have avoided the untoward result, the plaintiffcould
recover, notwithstanding that the defendants exercised reasonable care in all
respects." Id. at 387. The thinking here seems similar to the Carlin court's omniscient
manufacturer standard.
62. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
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it brooked no compromise. Asbestos manufacturers were to be
held responsible for failing to warn of risks that came to
fruition, even if entirely unknowable at the time of distribu-
tion; liability was to be measured ex post. The firestorm of
criticism set off by Beshada and the quick retreat of the New
Jersey court to an ex ante approach for all products other than
asbestos is a now familiar story.63 Presumably the California
Supreme Court "hybrid" approach in Carlin is an effort to avoid
the criticism of an ex post liability standard on intuitive
fairness grounds: How can one justly be held responsible for
failing to warn of risks that are unknowable at the time of
marketing?
The effort at reconciliation is deeply problematic, however,
if understandable. Simply put, an expansive negligence prin-
ciple obliging manufacturers to "keep abreast of any scientific
discoveries and ... know the results of all such advances"
6 4
would accomplish virtually the same results in the real world
of products cases as the Carlin "hybrid" approach, without all
of the confusion engendered by reference to a "strict liability"
standard that is not really "strict."65 In the final analysis, all
of the straining and potential confusion in the recent California
cases appears to be little more than an effort to pay obeisance
to the Escola/Greenman manifesto of a brave new world of
strict liability for defective products.
66
V. OcCAM's RAZOR
California's ongoing struggle with strict liability and negli-
gence exemplifies a problem that the Restatement (Third) tries
to avoid. From one perspective, the new Restatement can be
63. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984) (citing to some
of the many critics of the Beshada reasoning, and limiting the holding to its facts);
see also Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 693 (1985). It
should be pointed out, however, that Feldman did shift the burden of proof on
questions of knowledge of risk to the defendant-arguably creating responsibility
roughly equivalent to that which would be imposed, in real world cases, under an ex
post strict liability standard. See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort
Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Klevorick, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 633, 635 (1985).
64. Carlin, 920 P.2d at 1351 n.3.
65. Reconsider the illustrative hypothetical, supra note 60.
66. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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viewed as an effort to cut through the confusion engendered by
all of this loose talk about strict liability and negligence, as
well as the failure in the earlier section 402A even to acknowl-
edge the need for establishing categories of product defect
cases. Section 2 of the new Restatement articulates the now
familiar tripartite breakdown of products cases into manufac-
turing, design, and warning defects, and then proceeds to
create what amounts to strict liability for manufacturing
defects and negligence liability for design and warning de-
fects--but without getting caught up in labeling issues.6" The
approach is straightforward and comprehensive.
But, of course, the new Restatement effort is more than an
exercise in the aesthetics of design. It takes strong positions
on issues that remain highly divisive. At the most fundamental
level a twofold problem exists. First, the contract paradigm for
conceptualizing product injuries has never been put entirely
to rest. This is most clearly evident in the continuing debate
over the appropriate standard-consumer expectations or risk-
utility balancing-in design defect litigation. To the extent that
the competing tort paradigm is identified with risk-utility
analysis, a continuing tension exists between those courts and
commentators who view products liability primarily as an en-
gine for creating efficient incentives for safety and those who
view it primarily as a mechanism for achieving fair treatment
and compensation for injury victims.
68
67. Section 2, which makes no mention of the terms "strict liability" or "negli-
gence," provides:
For purposes of determining liability under § 1:
(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2.
68. For criticism on this score of the risk-utility perspective taken in the new
Restatement, see Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The
ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 666 (1995) (faulting the proposed
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Second, within the tort regime, there is no clear consensus
on whether the dominant strand of enterprise liability ideology
should be risk-spreading or deterrence. This disagreement is
most apparent in the sustained warfare over the appropriate
standard in adequacy of warning cases-strict liability or
negligence.69 The lines of divergence are demarcated clearly
when unknowable risks of harm exist at the time a product is
marketed. One strand of enterprise liability ideology is pre-
mised on the manufacturer's superior ability to spread the risk:
in particular, through spreading via the pricing mechanism.
Under this risk-spreading rationale, just as under a consumer
expectations perspective, "true" strict liability seems appropri-
ate. The manufacturer remains the better risk-spreader wheth-
er or not the injury occurred from risks that were knowable at
the time the product was put on the market. By contrast, under
a safety incentives rationale for products liability, there is no
basis for allocating responsibility to the manufacturer for risks
that cannot reasonably be discerned when the product is
marketed. A liability rule creates no incentive to warn of risks
that are unknown at the time of distribution.
The present Restatement enterprise may cause discomfort to
some because it brings these fundamental tensions to the
surface. In my view, however, these disagreements are healthy.
They foster a continuing dialogue that deepens our understand-
ing of the implications of policy choices made at the doctrinal
level. A Restatement effort that awaited a shared consensus in
an area as dynamic as products liability-rather than taking
well-considered and forthright positions on issues that have
reached maturity-would have to be postponed indefinitely.
Restatement (Third) because of its "lack of recognition of the importance of product
portrayal and product image [which] leads to a lack of appropriate emphasis on the
expectations that consumers reasonably develop about products"); see also Joseph W.
Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability Actions for
Defectiuely Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1203-04 (1994) (criticizing risk-
utility analysis under the proposed Restatement (Third) because it completely
eliminates strict liability in design defect cases, forcing plaintiffs to prove a reasonable
alternative design even in cases involving inherently dangerous products).
69. For a wide-ranging expression of views on the Restatement (Third) effort,
much of it critical of the departures from strict liability principles, see A Symposium
on the ALl's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1043 (1994).
